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TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION. By David A.J. Richards. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. xvii, 348. $29.95. 
In his book Toleration and the Constitution, Professor David A.J. 
Richards1 ambitiously attempts to synthesize diverse ideas of modem 
thought into a new concept of constitutional interpretation. Richards 
tackles political and legal theory, history, psychology, sociology, and 
even literary theory in this book; his results, while certainly thought-
provoking, are often less than coherent. These various disciplines, ac-
cording to Richards, share the common themes of toleration and the 
"right to conscience," themes which explain and clarify the political 
values that underlie the Constitution. 
Part I of this four-part book surveys a variety of legal and political 
theories put forward by John Hart Ely,2 Learned Hand,3 Herbert 
Wechsler, 4 Frederick Schauer, 5 and others. These theories are found 
wanting because they fail to take proper account of general moral and 
political theory in constitutional interpretation. Some theories, such 
as Raoul Berger's originalism which emphasizes the Framers' intent, 
are found to be too historically dependent; others, such as Ely's pro-
cess-oriented approach which edits out historical doctrines inconsis-
tent with its concepts, are too historically independent. Richards 
proposes instead a rights-based constitutional theory, and puts for-
ward Ronald Dworkin's rights thesis6 as a model. Richards claims 
that his theory, which emphasizes "fit" or precedent, as well as back-
ground rights, will pull together "an approach that yields at once a 
fidelity to our history and a more critically defensible political theory" 
(p. 21). Richards, by applying Dworkin's model to American consti-
tutional history, comes up with the interpretive concept that he be-
lieves best accounts for the historical traditions and background ethics 
of constitutional jurisprudence: "a contractarian model calling for ob-
1. Professor of Law at New York University School of Law and author of several ethics 
books, including SEX, DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW (1982) which was awarded the Best Book 
in Criminal Justice Ethics in 1982. 
2. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
3. See L. HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS (1968). 
4. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. l 
(1959). 
5. See Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797 (1982). 
6. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977). The rights thesis is a the-
ory of adjudication suggesting how judges should decide "hard cases." Dworkin proposes that 
when faced with a new, hard case, a judge should first search for the principle in prior decisions 
which will best explain the new case; the judge should then modify or reinterpret (perhaps even 
overrule) the principle by reference to background political rights of the legal system. Thus, 
"[t]he rights thesis has two aspects. Its descriptive aspect explains the present structure of the 
institution of adjudication. Its normative aspect offers a political justification for that structure." 
Id. at 123. 
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servance by the state of predictable and orderly constraints that ac-
knowledge and express the dignity of persons and citizens as free, 
rational, and equal" (p. 56). 
The latter three parts of the book examine religious liberty, free 
speech, and the right to privacy. Richards believes that these constitu-
tional guarantees reflect the basic recognition of freedom, equality, 
and right to conscience. 
Richards' analysis of religious liberty - the free exercise and anti-
establishment clauses of the first amendment7 - is markedly histori-
cal. He identifies the "inalienable right to conscience" as the central 
value of both religious and political thought by drawing on social psy-
chology's theories of rational personhood, Christianity's treatment of 
individual conscience, and the development of contractarian political 
theory by Locke, Bayle, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls. 
"The natural consequence of the argument for an inalienable right 
to conscience is universal toleration" (p. 95). The concern for reli-
gious toleration, according to Richards, inspired the Framers to create 
the religion clauses and over time has motivated the Court to expand 
the protection provided for religion and ethical conscience. Thus, 
Richards sees the moral right to conscience as a background right, in 
Dworkin's sense, underlying and making interpretive sense of the reli-
gion clauses. 
Part III of the book describes how the same right to conscience 
which underlies the religion clauses lies behind the Constitution's free 
speech guarantees. Once again, Richards begins by elaborating the 
ways in which speech and writing are exercises of an individual's 
moral independence, and then moves on to an analysis of free speech 
jurisprudence. 
According to Richards, the Supreme Court has adequately pro-
tected freedom of speech in the areas of subversive advocacy, group 
libel, offense in the public forum, obscenity, and commercial speech. 
While protection, especially in the context of obscenity could be 
broader, Richards believes that the Supreme Court understands and is 
committed to the theme of moral independence and a right to 
conscience. 
Richards disapproves, however, of two other areas of free speech 
jurisprudence in which he believes "the Supreme Court has failed to 
understand such principles of equal respect" (p. 215). First, in the 
area of regulating campaign finances, the Court erred by striking down 
expenditure limitations as an inhibition of free speech interests. 8 Sec-
ond, the Court has failed to encourage laws requiring equal access to 
7. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof ..•. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
8. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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newspapers as a function of the right of free access to public forums. 9 
In both of these areas Richards seems to find inadequate attention be-
ing paid to the inability of certain minorities and economically disad-
vantaged people to make themselves heard. He argues that the 
modem state has a responsibility "to assure the rich matrix of public 
forums" (p. 221) in order to help equalize power among differing 
ideas. Again, Richards believes such equalization is essential to princi-
ples of freedom and personal autonomy. 
Richards realizes that his thesis, applied to the areas of religious 
liberty and free speech, is relatively uncontroversial since these areas 
are "settled features of our law" (p. 227). In Part IV, Richards goes 
further out on the limb by arguing that this right to conscience should 
expand the less-settled constitutional right to privacy. Again, Rich-
ards first develops the connections between contractarian political the-
ory, a right to conscience, and constitutional privacy, and then applies 
his theory to privacy jurisprudence in an attempt to explain and justify 
the Supreme Court's decisions. 
Richards points out that constitutional privacy guarantees are 
neither found in the language of the Constitution, nor justified by 
political theories about shifting moral consensus or the harm principle. 
The theory of shifting moral consensus argues that when public opin-
ion about what is morally wrong changes, constitutional adjudication 
should shift accordingly. To Richards, this theory is inadequate be-
cause it fails to explain "how, normatively, we should assess [a 
change's] justifiability" (p. 236). The harm principle (proposed by 
John Stuart Mil1)10 argues that the state may properly criminalize only 
those actions which inflict concrete harms on other people. The the-
ory rests on utilitarianism, and Richards believes this is a fatal fl.aw. 
Utilitarianism desires to maximize pleasure over pain; in many cases, 
says Richards, the restraint and toleration required by the harm prin-
ciple would not maximize society's emotional pleasure. Thus utilitari-
anism and the harm principle are incompatible and comprise a fl.awed 
theory. 
Contractarian theory, says Richards, is the best political theory to 
interpret constitutional privacy. Respect for moral independence jus-
tifies prohibitions on state intrusion into that independence. Intimate 
relationships, which shape and organize our emotions and values, are 
"among the essential resources of moral independence" (p. 244). The 
constitutional protection of marriage grows out of this. Public power, 
under contractarian theory, must be limited to the pursuit of general 
goods that rational and reasonable people would want protected. 
Applying this theory to the jurisprudence of constitutional privacy, 
9. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
10. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (A. Castell ed. 1947). 
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Richards begins with the contraception cases. 11 He heavily empha-
sizes the rights of couples to control their sexual lives and thus express 
themselves within personal relationships. He touches again on the 
fundamental right to marriage and concludes that laws prohibiting 
contraception rest on outdated, non-neutral notions that sex must nec-
essarily be linked with procreation. 
The same themes carry over to Richards' discussion of abortion, 
although here he is on shakier ground. He claims that prohibiting 
abortion is not the sort of good that rational and reasonable people 
want protected because a fetus is not a full moral person. Of course 
this is exactly the conclusion which many abortion foes hotly dispute. 
Richards glosses over this problem, however, and goes on to explain 
that prohibition of abortion "fails, at a deep ethical level, to take seri-
ously the moral independence of women as free and rational persons" 
(p. 268). He points out that the abortion dispute arises from disagree-
ments over sexuality and gender roles, precisely the type of disagree-
ments which the state should leave to be resolved by personal moral 
conscience. 
Richards last discusses the law dealing with sexual autonomy. He 
argues that the Supreme Court's failure to strike down anti-sodomy 
laws12 is a failure to understand the background constitutional right to 
conscience and an abridgement of the rights of three groups: many 
heterosexual couples, certain disabled people, and homosexual men 
and women. Richards again notes that intimate relationships are an 
essential resource of moral independence. He points out that anti-sod-
omy laws rest on false and dubious moral beliefs. Moreover, he claims 
that the state should interfere in moral autonomy only to protect gen-
eral, neutral goods, such as those which assure necessary and indispen-
sable protection of life, bodily security, and integrity. 
Richards concludes that the protection of a right to privacy should 
be broadened and strengthened: "Subversive conscience, speech, and 
ways of life are all of a piece, and all equally actuate the understanding 
and elaboration of our constitutional ideals of the moral sovereignty of 
each free person over oneself and the state" (p. 279). 
Toleration and the Constitution is an ambitious undertaking, and 
there are times when it is evident that Richards has bitten off more 
than he can chew. It is, in the first place, probably impossible to give 
adequate shrift in three hundred pages to all the concepts which Rich-
ards brings forth. He covers not only the religion clauses, free speech, 
and privacy; he also comments on federalism, the separation of pow-
ers, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, cruel 
and unusual punishment, judicial review, law and politics, and the 
11. Pp. 256-61. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965). 
12. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). 
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place of a law school in the university community. He further ponders 
the morality of the death penalty, polygamy, drugs, euthanasia, adul-
tery, sexual solicitation, and genocide. His political theory attempts to 
draw from or overcome many other theories; he spends as little as two 
pages a piece trying to summarize and criticize such political and reli-
gious thinkers as Kant, Rousseau, Bayle, Jefferson, Madison, St. Au-
gustine, Thomas Aquinas, Jonathan Edwards, and a host of more 
modem types. 
It is often too much .. It is easy to see how such theorists, concepts, 
and areas of law are related - it is more difficult to see why they are 
necessarily interdependent, as Richards would nave us believe. Legal 
and political scholars will find gaps in his arguments - for example, 
Richards needs to provide us with a more thorough definition of "neu-
tral good." A neutral good accepted by reasonable people (which 
Richards would protect) may really be just an expression of current 
majority consensus (which Richards argues does not merit protection). 
In addition, how can Richards reconcile his support of a prohibition 
on noncoercive sexual solicitation with his support of free speech prin-
ciples? If we're allowed to talk why can't we solicit each other to have 
sex? Positivists will be unconvinced that he has made the case for 
connecting law and morality; natural law theorists will be uncon-
vinced that he has added anything much to Rawls or Dworkin. 
For these reasons, Richards may find that his book fails to capture 
a large audience. He writes in his preface, "I have written this book 
for both the general reader and for specialists in law, philosophy, or 
history" (p. viii). Unfortunately, specialists will likely wonder if the 
theory is actually logically sound and may be put off by Richards' 
dramatic language - for example, Richards' condemnation of "this 
brutal and callous impersonal manipulation by the state of intimate 
personal life" (p. 272) in his discussion of sexual autonomy. The gen-
eral reader untrained in philosophy, on the other hand, may find it 
difficult to grasp the relatively sophisticated philosophical theory that 
Richards outlines, and the scope of the doctrine which he covers. 
Richards himself recognizes this and suggests in the preface that dif-
ferent readers may want to skip certain sections of the book. He may 
find that readers wish to skip the book altogether. 
Toleration and the Constitution is, however, an interesting read for 
those willing to devote the time to work through it. It is not a ground-
breaking book but it is an eclectic grab-bag of ideas; a book which 
touches on many areas of life and thought. The ideas are sometimes 
controversial, sometimes ultimately unsupported, but are capable of 
piqueing the interest of those concerned with modem constitutional 
adjudication. 
- Judith L. Hudson 
